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Abstract

This research examined the return on investment of Department of Defense test
and evaluation. The thesis analyzed the return on investment of the cost avoidance
achieved if an issue discovered late in the program had been discovered and corrected
during developmental test and evaluation. The methodology utilized two case study
examples from the Joint Primary Training Aircraft System to calculate the potential cost
avoidance and the potential return on investment if the program had discovered and
corrected the issues during developmental test and evaluation. The result of one case was
a 9,260% return on investment. The other case results ranged from a -24% to a 153%
return on investment. Both cases illustrated the potential return on investment but no
statistically significant conclusions can be obtained from the results. Based on the
literature’s discussion on the value of identifying problems as early as possible and the
potential return on investment from these two cases, further research is essential. This
research resulted in proposing multiple recommendations to enhance the acquisition
process in an attempt to preserve the long term affordability and long term national
defense strategy.
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EXAMINING THE RETURN ON INVESTMENT OF TEST AND EVALUATION

I. Introduction
Background
The United States may be rapidly approaching the most financially challenging
time in American history. As of Jan 31, 2015, the total U.S. public debt continued its rise
over $18.1 trillion, and the total U.S. unfunded liabilities reached $93.7 trillion (U.S.
Debt Clock, 2015). In an attempt to limit federal spending, the President and Congress
passed the Budget Control Act of 2011. This legislation will continue to place
constraints on the Department of Defense (DoD) budget for the foreseeable future. Dr.
Frank Kendall, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD(AT&L)), in September 2013 acknowledged, “The budget situation we’re in is
pretty much unprecedented. I have not seen this kind of gridlock on Capitol Hill” (Naval
Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland, 2013).
As funding diminishes, the DoD must balance risk and uncertainty while
managing difficult budget decisions. The DoD is currently experiencing personnel
reductions, acquisition program terminations or a reduction in an acquisition program’s
production quantity, and requests for Congress to authorize base realignment and closure
(BRAC). As these events occur, the DoD continues to investigate innovative ideas to
save money or reduce costs through efficiencies. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense Darlene Costello, in July 2014 stated, "There are more things out there that the
warfighter would like to have that we're not even planning...so anything we can do to
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make our process more efficient and find some savings would be very beneficial to the
whole enterprise” (Lyngaas, 2014).
Conducting early and rigorous test and evaluation (T&E) on DoD acquisition
programs supports the DoD in accomplishing its objective of saving money and also
reduces uncertainty. DoD program managers (PMs) must confront fiscal realities
requiring them to balance risk and uncertainty when formulating budget decisions for
T&E. “Ideally, the PM bases all development decisions on test events and not schedules
or costs; but in the pragmatic environment of developing systems for the Warfighter, time
and cost prove significant drivers in pressuring test activities” (Defense Acquisition
University, 2013:Ch 9, 11). “Because these events will occur later anyway, Program
Managers (PMs) frequently trade off developmental testing (‘we’ll do that in operational
testing’) for near-term buying power” (Hutchison, 2013:133). These tactics often result
in programs discovering problems late in the acquisition process that require costly
modifications to the system. As DoD appropriations declined, the budgetary culture
shifted to pursuing decisions based on what risks could be transferred to the future with
the sole purpose of increasing the current budget authority.
“You must spend money to make money,” a phrase first articulated by Plautus, a
Roman poet and philosopher, has since been applied throughout the business world
(BrainyQuote, 2014). Pertaining to T&E, PMs should consistently scrutinize the
program’s life cycle costs (LCC), not just the current budget situation, and spend (invest)
money early in the T&E process to make (save) money in the future. The future savings
occur by eliminating expensive modifications late in the acquisition process.
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In order to convince PMs of the value of T&E investments, defensible,
quantitative data and analysis must validate the claim. Currently, a study calculating the
return on investment (ROI) of DoD T&E does not exist. However, this research begins
the process of collecting and analyzing program data with the aim of laying the
groundwork for analyzing the ROI of T&E.
Justification for Research
“In 2010, Congress expressed concern that significant problems with acquisition
programs are being discovered during operational testing that: (1) should have been
discovered in development testing and (2) should have been corrected prior to operational
testing” (Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 2014:13). Because of Congressional
concerns, beginning in its fiscal year (FY) 2011 report, the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation (DOT&E), started reporting significant issues observed in operational testing
that “in my view should have been discovered and resolved prior to the commencement
of operational testing” (Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 2011:11). The FY
2013 report expanded the classification of the issues into four types of cases illustrated in
Figure 1. Between 2010 and 2013, DOT&E classified 46 DoD programs under its
oversight as case 1 problems. Despite the increased scrutiny concerning these issues, the
DOT&E FY 2013 report acknowledged, “Unfortunately, each year, operational testing
continues to reveal performance problems for a significant number of programs that
should have been discovered in developmental testing” (Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, 2014:13).
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Figure 1. Problem Discovery Cases Observed in DOT&E Oversight Programs (Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation, 2014:13)

This research concentrates on case 1, the worst case, and discusses the
significance of the consequences of case 1 problems. According to DOT&E,
The implication is that developmental testing (DT) was not conducted or was not
adequate to uncover the problem prior to operational testing (OT). These cases
illustrate that when decision makers focus too much on budget and schedule and
not enough on the outcomes of testing (and the need to conduct adequate
developmental testing), there is an increased likelihood of observing problems in
operational testing. (Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 2014:13)

Numerous Government Accountability Office (GAO), Defense Science Board (DSB),
National Research Council (NRC), and Inspector General (IG) reports unanimously agree
4

that issues discovered and corrected early result in less costly modifications. However,
quantitative data measuring the savings from early discovery and corrective action
remain absent from the literature. A 2000 DSB report concluded,
The Task Force found that the most significant capability missing in the T&E
community is the ability to measure the ‘value of testing.’ What do you get for
what you spend? Is testing worth what we spend? The Task Force found no
processes and no metrics to determine the return on investment of the Test and
Evaluation process at the Department, Service Headquarters or Test Command
Facilities…This Task Force suggests that a serious investigation on the cost to the
Government of the failure to test properly be undertaken…The value of this
process must be measured and used to justify, defend and intelligently increase
funding for this vital activity. (Defense Science Board Task Force, 2000:3; 5; 27)
The recommendations from the 2000 DSB still remain unheeded today.
Issue Investigated
Three problems persist in the T&E process despite decades of studies and reports
documenting the issues: late testing, inadequate testing, or, in a number of cases,
proceeding to the next acquisition phase despite recommendations from test officials
against it. Frequently, these problems result in costly retrofits in addition to increasing
the program schedule because of the time required to correct and retest to ensure the issue
does not reoccur. Individual PMs retain the decision authority on T&E activities but do
not possess quantitative data on the value of T&E. Consequently, the current budget
situation often influences trade-offs of T&E resources without a careful consideration of
the LCC and the potentially detrimental modification costs in the future if an issue
remains undiscovered until late in the program. This thesis examines the value of T&E
by analyzing the ROI of the potential cost avoidance achieved if issues discovered late in
a program had been discovered and corrected during developmental test and evaluation
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(DT&E). The research question examines what is the ROI of the cost avoidance
achieved if an issue discovered late in the program had been discovered and corrected
during DT&E?
Scope and Limitations
This research intended to include data of case 1 issues, which directly relate to the
inquiry from Congress, from the annual DOT&E reports covering the last three FYs. The
sponsor of this research, the Scientific Test and Analysis Techniques (STAT) in Test and
Evaluation Center of Excellence, utilized its connections within the T&E community to
attempt to acquire the data, but unfortunately the data did not become available for this
research. Therefore, the joint primary aircraft training system (JPATS) program office,
which is not one of the programs under DOT&E oversight, provided the data for this
research. The cases are not case 1 issues; however, the two JPATS cases demonstrate the
thesis argument: one case exhibits inadequate testing and the other case illustrates the
elimination of testing, both requiring costly modifications. Instead of discovering the
issues during operational testing, the discovery of the issues occurred during operational
use of the aircraft. Thus, the scope consists of two JPATS issues discovered during
operational use of the aircraft and not during testing.
Examining a small sample size of issues from only one program creates an
obvious limitation. Further, the example cases provided do not match the original intent
of case 1 issues (discovered during OT&E but not during DT&E). Because the examples
of this research were not discovered during testing, the argument could be made that the
issues could not have been discovered during any testing. However, the program office
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subject matter experts (SMEs) specifically identified these issues that should have been
discovered and corrected during DT&E and both case studies provide further background
supporting the SME’s claims.
Methodology
A case study approach examines two examples of issues discovered late in the
JPATS program that, according to program office SMEs, should have been discovered
during developmental testing and previously corrected. Historical background of both
the JPATS program and the two issues establish the context of why these two particular
cases are examined. Then, for both cases, the methodological approach for calculating
the ROI is presented. First, the actual costs of correcting the problem are calculated.
Next, with the assistance of SMEs, a cost estimate is developed based on the assumption
that the issue was discovered and corrected beforehand, during developmental testing,
and prior to the start of production. Finally, a comparison of the actual costs with the
estimated costs determines the cost avoidance and ROI.
Overview of Thesis
This thesis utilizes a four-chapter format. Chapter I introduces the thesis, which
includes the background, justification for the research, issues investigated, the scope and
limitations of the research, an introduction to the methodology, and an overview of the
thesis. Chapter II discusses the literature review, which includes an overview of T&E,
incentives driving the acquisition system, historical T&E reports and studies, and prior
research methodologies. Chapter III identifies the methodological framework,
investigates the background of the JPATS program and the two cases studies, applies the
7

methodology to the two examples, and reports the results. Finally, Chapter IV concludes
the research by assessing the findings, providing recommendations for future research,
discussing and presenting recommendations on acquisition reform, and describing the
significance of the research.
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II. Literature Review
The literature review includes four sections. First, an overview of T&E
establishes background context by defining the purpose of T&E and discussing the
establishment of the offices of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)
and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Test and Evaluation
(DASD(DT&E)). Next, the incentives driving the DoD acquisition process are
examined. Then, the historical T&E reports section emphasizes the inadequacy of T&E
as reported by a multitude of reports during the last 25 years and further justifies the
critical need for this research. Finally, the last section examines the T&E universe of
literature for methodologies previously utilized to determine the value of T&E.
Overview of T&E
The subsequent excerpt, from the 2012 DoD T&E Management Guide, depicts
the DoD’s purpose of T&E as well as brief explanations and differences of DT&E and
OT&E.
The fundamental purpose of T&E is to provide essential information to decision
makers, verify and validate performance capabilities documented as requirements,
assess attainment of technical performance parameters, and determine whether
systems are operationally effective, suitable, survivable, and safe for intended use.
During the early phases of development, T&E is conducted to demonstrate the
feasibility of conceptual approaches, evaluate design risk, identify design
alternatives, compare and analyze trade-offs, and estimate satisfaction of
operational requirements. As a system undergoes design and development, the
iterative process of testing moves gradually from a concentration on DT&E,
which is concerned chiefly with attainment of engineering design goals and
verification of technical specifications, to increasingly comprehensive OT&E,
which focuses on questions of operational effectiveness, suitability, and
survivability. (Department of Defense, 2012:23)
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Not only does T&E provide insight and value to multiple customers and the PM, but
T&E planning and results play a critical role as part of the Milestone Decision Authority
(MDA) review process (Department of Defense, 2012:24).
Congress has demonstrated concerns with the T&E process for over 40 years.
Beginning in 1971, Congress required the DoD to report major weapon system’s OT&E
results to Congress before it would commit production dollars (U.S. General Accounting
Office, 1989:2). Congress continued to receive reports from the General Accounting
Office (GAO), the DoD Inspector General, and other government agencies detailing the
inadequacy of OT&E and decided to enact legislation establishing the office of the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) (U.S. General Accounting Office,
1994a:1). DOT&E provides independent oversight to the military services, coordinates
the military services’ planning and execution of operational tests, independently
evaluates operational test results, and reports independent and objective evaluations to
DoD leadership and Congress (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1989:2).
In 2009, Congress passed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act
(WSARA). The goal of WSARA was to improve DoD’s procedures for acquiring major
weapon systems. The legislation aimed to establish a sound program foundation by
focusing on early weapon systems development activities, which include DT&E (U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 2010b:1). One WSARA initiative established the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Test and Evaluation
DASD(DT&E) (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010b:5). DASD(DT&E) acts
as a principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics (USD(AT&L)), develops DT&E policy and guidance, reviews and approves
10

DT&E plans and test activities, and submits an annual report to Congress discussing the
year’s DT&E activities (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010b:8). Figure 2
depicts the current DoD T&E organizational structure.

Figure 2. DoD T&E Organizational Structure (Department of Defense, 2012:10)

Examining the Incentives Driving the DoD Acquisition Process
This section examines the incentives that drive the DoD acquisition process.
Public choice theory, front loading, and political engineering establish the context for
analyzing DoD incentives. First, the fundamentals of public choice theory are examined.
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Next, two additional concepts, front loading and political engineering, are reviewed.
Finally, the acquisition process is investigated to identify examples of incentives
influencing deviations from policy.
Tenets of public choice theory establish the foundation for incentives driving
bureaucratic behavior. Public choice theory disputes the traditional belief that portrays
bureaucrats as benevolent public servants faithfully executing the will of the people.
Instead, it models bureaucratic behavior applying utility maximization and the economic
model of rational behavior, which assumes individuals act in a rational, self-interested
manner. Bureaucrats strive to advance in their careers and politicians pursue votes to win
elections. The motivations of individuals in government are no different than the
motivations of individuals in the market economy (Shughart II, 2008).
Two additional concepts, front loading and political engineering, further support
the idea of how incentives influence bureaucratic choices. Both concepts were first
introduced by Franklin Spinney, a former military analyst for the Pentagon. “Front
loading is the practice of planting seed money for new programs while downplaying their
future obligations” (Spinney, 1998). Front loading encourages overoptimistic risk, cost,
and schedule assumptions to acquire support from skeptics in the Pentagon and Congress.
“Political engineering is the strategy of spreading dollars, jobs, and profits to as many
important congressional districts as possible. By making voters dependent on
government money flows, the political engineers put the squeeze on Congress to support
the front-loaded program once its true costs become apparent” (Spinney, 1998). Because
a politician’s constituents are geographically located, politicians are incentivized to
12

support programs or policies in their home district even if it they are less than ideal for
the national interest. The benefits become increasingly favorable when financed by
national taxes, mostly from other districts (Shughart, II, 2008). For example, the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) provides 32,500 jobs in 46 states, and 18 of the 46 states
received an economic impact of over $100M. Additionally, ten other countries are
economically impacted by the F-35 (Bender et al., 2014). Both concepts involve
controlling money and power.
The following examples illustrate the incentives that cause deviations from
policy. A myriad of studies, reviews, and panels over the last few decades repeatedly
recommended not initiating a program until demonstrating maturity of the technology by
ensuring the technology works as intended. The DoD has incorporated these
recommendations into policy. Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 states,
Risk Reduction Decision, called Milestone A by DoD, is an investment decision
to pursue specific product or design concepts, and to commit the resources
required to mature technology and/or reduce any risks that must be mitigated prior
to decisions committing the resources needed for development leading to
production and fielding. The decision to commit resources to the development of
a product for manufacturing and fielding, called Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD) by DoD, follows completion of any needed technology
maturation and risk reduction … Formally, the development contract award
authorized at DoD’s Milestone B is the critical decision point in an acquisition
program because it commits the organization’s resources to a specific product,
budget profile, choice of suppliers, contract terms, schedule, and sequence of
events leading to production and fielding. (Department of Defense, 2015:7)
The dominant factor that causes deviations from policy is simple and discussed in DoD
policy. Funding is the number one incentive driving the acquisition system. According
to a 2005 GAO report that interviewed PMs:
Virtually all program managers we spoke with first defined success in terms of
enabling warfighters and doing so in a timely and cost-efficient manner. But when
13

the point was pursued further, it became clear that the implied definition for
success in DoD is attracting funds for new programs, and keeping funds for
ongoing programs. (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005:56)
Once the competition for funds starts, the PM is pressured into overly optimistic cost,
schedule, and risk assessments and to censor potentially damaging news about the
program. It is better to avoid or delay difficult tests that could result in potentially
damaging news which could possibly impede program progress and reduce future
funding (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005:56).
One way to separate a program and attract funding is through differentiation.
Differentiation, most often generated through advanced technology, incentivizes the
acceptance of immature technology and overly optimistic performance assessments (U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 2005:54). If the DoD wants to fund a particular
technology to meet a capability requirement, it can attract more funding and ensure
commitment to the funding in a formal acquisition program instead of through science
and technology activities (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005:57). Although
acquisition programs and science and technology endeavors both support the acquisition
process, both compete for the same acquisition funding. As a result, the incentives
encourage accepting immature technologies into a program to both increase and commit
to the flow of money despite the increased risks. Unnecessary additional risk is accepted
under the assumption the issues will eventually be solved (U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 2005:58).
In addition, agencies attempt to justify larger budgets by accepting immature
technologies or programs. In a sense, acquisition programs represent both revenue
(larger budgets) as well as expenditures (U.S. Government Accountability Office,
14

2014b:8). Success can often be represented by the size of the budget controlled. In
public choice literature, “Budget maximization was assumed to be the bureaucracy’s goal
because more agency funding translates into broader administrative discretion, more
opportunities for promotion, and greater prestige for the agency’s bureaucrats” (Shughart
II, 2008). This results in an empire building effect whereby agencies or individuals
attempt to maximize the budget and power of their empire.
The GAO, in 2005, interviewed PMs both inside and outside the DoD and wrote a
report on the importance of supporting PMs to improve acquisition outcomes. “Program
managers themselves believe that rather than making strategic investment decisions, DoD
starts more programs than it can afford and rarely prioritizes them for funding purposes”
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005:5). This initiates the competition for
funds at the inception of the acquisition process. DoD PMs identified the following as a
few of the chief difficulties they face from the competition of funds: unstable funding,
spending a considerable amount of time advocating for the program or preparing and
briefing updates for oversight purposes that do not strategically help the program, and
accepting additional requirements forced upon the program (U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 2005). One DoD PM said, “Unstable funding results in pressure
to do aggressive things in order to minimize the impact of budget cuts on schedule and
performance. I believe this has been a major factor in recent…program execution
problems” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005:40).
Another element critical to successful programs is PM and acquisition executive
tenure. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act was enacted in 1990 and
codified in Title 10, United State Code (USC) Armed Forces 1701 – 1764. Title 10, USC
15

1734 requires both a PM and deputy PM “be assigned to the position at least until
completion of the major milestone that occurs closest in time to the date on which the
person has served in the position for four years” (Cornell University Law School, n.d.).
This law has been in place 25 years and rarely implemented. A 2007 GAO review
discovered “39 major acquisition programs started since March 2001, the average time in
development was about 37 months. The average tenure for program managers on those
programs during that time was about 17.2 months” (U.S. Government Accountability
Office, 2007b:8). Career progression/broadening appear to influence tenure length more
than public law and DoD policy.
Historical T&E Reports (GAO/DSB/DOT&E)
This section emphasizes the chronological documentation of the inadequacy of
T&E from 1989 to 2014. Several different organizations including the GAO, DSB, and
DOT&E authored the reports. A summary of each report’s key topics applicable to this
research follows.
A 1989 United States General Accounting Office (GAO) report entitled Adequacy
of Department of Defense Operational Test and Evaluation reported the prepared
statement of Frank C. Conahan, Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and
International Affairs Division. Frank Conahan discussed the inadequacy of OT&E and
the inconducive environment for thorough OT&E created by concurrent development.
The conclusion from this report and over 50 GAO reports since 1970 remained that
“testing has not been comprehensive, realistic or rigorous…sound and independent
testing is needed if systems are to avoid costly redesign and modification after production
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or deployment” (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1989:1). Too often trade-offs occur
between testing and possible delays in fielding. The report identifies possible causes of
the trade-offs including “such factors as urgency of the requirement and the cost of
building prototypes may…outweigh the need to identify and correct performance
shortcomings identified through operational testing and evaluation” (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 1989:1).
Frank Conahan also discussed his concern with concurrent acquisition programs
achieving performance objectives and the possibility of cost growth. Five concurrent
programs including Air Launch Cruise Missile, B-1B bomber, Sergeant York Air
Defense Gun, F/A-18 aircraft, and the AGM-88A High Speed Antiradiation Missile
failed to obtain critical OT&E results prior to the start of production despite the programs
plan to attain the test results before making a production decision (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 1989:7). The DoD IG also reported the C-17 and SINGCARS
programs failed to complete any OT&E before the production of a substantial quantity of
the systems. The GAO strongly encouraged programs to obtain OT&E results before
committing to production (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1989:11).
A 1994 United States General Accounting Office (GAO) report entitled Role of
Test and Evaluation in System Acquisition Should Not Be Weakened reported the
prepared statement of Louis J. Rodrigues, Director for Systems Development and
Production Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division. Louis Rodrigues
discussed T&E legislation proposals including GAO’s assessment of the proposals and
low rate initial production (LRIP) beginning before operational testing occurs. Mr.
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Rodrigues identified several issues leading to the legislation proposals, which attempted
to decrease T&E requirements and discipline.
The program office frequently regarded the start of production as the most
important aspect of the program regardless of the uncertainty of whether or not the
system worked as intended; consequently, the program office reduced the length of the
testing process in an attempt to reduce the length of the overall acquisition process and
start production as soon as possible (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1994a:6). Also,
the acquisition community viewed testing as a requirement imposed on them instead of a
tool to reduce technical risks and increase the chance of success for the program (U.S.
General Accounting Office, 1994a:5). In particular, developers expressed frustration
from delays and expenses imposed by conducting a rigorous testing program; however,
the test and evaluation master plan (TEMP), which included developers’ inputs,
determined the testing to be accomplished (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1994a:6). In
GAO’s experience, programs did not become delayed because of testing but because of
poor test performance, and acquisition schedules poorly forecasted the time required to
resolve any issues discovered during testing (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1994a:9).
Developers must demonstrate the promised capabilities and should not become frustrated
by the thorough testing needed to prove the capabilities (U.S. General Accounting Office,
1994a:6).
DoD programs persisted in starting and continuing LRIP based on schedule
considerations and not on the system’s technical maturity; furthermore, LRIP legislation
permitted and even encouraged LRIP before any operational testing occurred.
Frequently, systems entering LRIP prematurely encountered issues with effectiveness and
18

suitability in operational testing that required costly modifications. The C-17, T-45A,
B1-B defensive avionics, Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile, and many
electronic warfare systems all required design changes and costly modifications due to
poor test results (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1994a:10).
The GAO routinely recommended less concurrent development and production
and completing all possible operational testing before production to reduce the risk of
discovering issues after production begins (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1994a:10).
Despite these recommendations, GAO found “defense system acquisition programs
continue to enter and proceed well into production before being put under serious
scrutiny…there should be very few cases where there is a need to assume the additional
risks inherent in a highly concurrent acquisition strategy” (U.S. General Accounting
Office, 1994a:11).
“In light of the problems that we continue to find in the acquisition of defense
systems, the priority given to T&E should increase, not decrease” (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 1994a:1). The DoD should strengthen the “fly-before-buy” principle
and ensure the demonstration of requirements before making major commitments to the
program (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1994a:1). “Much more attention needs to be
focused on identifying and addressing problem areas earlier…because early fixes are less
expensive, easier to implement, and less disruptive to the program” (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 1994a:8).
The FY 2000 Defense Authorization Act established a Defense Science Board
(DSB) Task Force to review the DoD’s T&E capabilities. The report discussed the value
and quality of T&E within the DoD. It also emphasized T&E’s importance in the
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acquisition process because of the essential information T&E provides decision makers
(Defense Science Board Task Force, 2000:ES-1).
The first and most important topic discussed was the value of T&E. “The Task
Force found that the most significant capability missing in the T&E community is the
ability to measure the ‘value of testing.’ What do you get for what you spend? Is testing
worth what we spend?” (Defense Science Board Task Force, 2000:3). The task force did
not find a single process or metric within the DoD to measure the return on investment of
T&E (Defense Science Board Task Force, 2000:4).
Acquisition reformers repeatedly pressured program managers to reduce the test
program and program offices viewed T&E as a hurdle to progress to the next milestone
(Defense Science Board Task Force, 2000:4, 5). Historically, T&E accounted for only 34% of the total system cost, yet attempts to reduce T&E kept reoccurring. “With the vital
issues at stake, the minimal cost and the incredible value (return on test cost investment)
suggests we should maximize testing to discover any weaknesses or flaws as early as
possible” (Defense Science Board Task Force, 2000:3). The task force recommended
creating a methodology to determine the value of testing and utilizing the methodology to
“justify, defend and intelligently increase funding for this vital activity” (Defense Science
Board Task Force, 2000:5).
The report also discussed the quality of T&E. Continuous pressure on programs
to reduce costs without impacting the schedule caused programs to “decrease the number
of test articles in the program, omit steps in the testing process, use more Modeling and
Simulation (M&S) even if the M&S is not truly representative of the subject system,
arrange for waivers to simplify testing and avoid trouble spots, etc.” (Defense Science
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Board Task Force, 2000:19). Each circumstance degraded the quality of testing. In
several instances, the task force found developmental testing lacked the robustness
needed to discover flaws in designs. Also, programs cut corners in the T&E process and
advanced systems to the next acquisition phase prior to being ready (Defense Science
Board Task Force, 2000:26).
The MV-22 program, one example cited in the report, severely cut the
developmental testing program to save money and recover from schedule slips (Defense
Science Board Task Force, 2000:27). An investigation into the MV-22B Osprey crash on
8 April 2000 that killed 19 marines cited testing that was severely curtailed (Defense
Science Board Task Force, 2000:28). “Despite the rhetoric about early involvement of
testers in programs, about testing for learning, or about discovering design and
operational problems early-on, we are not allocating sufficient funds early enough to
avoid costly redesigns, modifications or deferrals late in a program’s life” (Defense
Science Board Task Force, 2000:27). The task force recommended a reform of the
acquisition process to ensure adequate and robust T&E occur early in the acquisition
process (Defense Science Board Task Force, 2000:20).
The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) published a report in 2000
entitled A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better Weapon System Outcomes
after a request by the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on
Readiness and Management Support, Senate Committee on Armed Services. The report
examined “(1) how the conduct of testing and evaluation affects commercial and DoD
program outcomes, (2) how best commercial testing and evaluation practices compare
with DoD’s, and (3) what factors account for the differences in these practices” (U.S.
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General Accounting Office, 2000:4). The following paragraphs compare and contrast the
T&E process of the DoD and commercial firms as presented by the GAO report.
Discovering issues during the development process is normal; however, the
implementation of T&E, the most successful tool for identifying problems, vastly
differed between commercial firms and the DoD (U.S. General Accounting Office,
2000:4). One firm employed the phrase “late-cycle churn” to explain the scramble that
ensued after T&E identified a major problem late in the development stage that required
further money, time, and effort to correct (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000:17).
The commercial companies GAO reviewed encountered late-cycle churn in the past, but
now utilize T&E to avoid late-cycle churn while creating products “in less time, with
higher quality, and at a lower cost” (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000:23). For
example, Boeing employed extensive T&E and delivered the 777-200 aircraft with a 60%
reduction in errors and rework (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000:23).
In contrast, late discovery and late-cycle churn persist in DoD programs. The
DoD too often waited and tested a full system, such as a missile launch or flying an
aircraft, in order to discover problems, instead of previously testing subsystems to
discover problems earlier in the development process. For example, multiple failures in
flight tests of the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system could have been
discovered during ground testing. Another example occurred in 1993 when the army
entered into a contract to purchase cargo trailers without first testing the trailers to ensure
they met requirements; 6,700 purchased truck trailers could no longer be used due to
safety concerns and damage to the trucks (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000:17).
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The companies GAO reviewed applied T&E to validate a product’s maturity and
ensure the product worked as intended (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000:26).
Three maturity levels comprised the validation process as shown in Figure 3. “The key to
minimizing surprises late in development is to reach the first two levels in such a way as
to limit the burden on the third level” (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000:26). To
accomplish this, challenging tests occurred early to uncover design flaws; AT&T
described the process as their “break it big early” philosophy and Boeing as “move
discovery to the left” (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000:28, 29). The successful
element common to all the firms was reducing the burden during system testing in the
late stages of development (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000:26).

Figure 3. Product Maturity Levels Commercial Firms Seek to Validate (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 2000:27)
In comparison, the DoD placed a disproportionate share of system validation on
maturity level 3 and attempted to reach all three levels of maturity late in development
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000:34). “Product knowledge was validated later,
with system level testing—such as flight testing—carrying a greater burden of discovery
and at a much higher cost than found in leading commercial firms” (U.S. General
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Accounting Office, 2000:26). Both the THAAD and DarkStar deferred testing of the first
two product maturity levels until maturity level 3. Program officials admitted taking
shortcuts and expected to acquire the necessary knowledge during flight testing (U.S.
General Accounting Office, 2000:34). Both programs experienced multiple flight test
failures which should have been discovered during standard tests conducted before flight
testing (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000:37).
In addition to the previous differences, commercial programs and DoD programs
operate under different incentives. Before taking office as the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), Dr. Jacques Gansler
identified the following differences.
In the commercial world, the reason for testing and evaluating a new item is to
determine where it will not work and to continuously improve it…By contrast,
testing and evaluation in the Department of Defense has tended to be a final
exam, or an audit, to see if a product works…This rather perverse use of testing
causes huge cost and time increases on the defense side, since tests are postponed
until the final exam and flaws are found late rather than early. (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 2000:41)
A successful commercial product launch requires identifying and solving unknown
factors as early as possible. Commercial managers view T&E as constructive because it
identifies and eliminates the unknown factors and consider testers to be valued assets to
the success of the product. Testers remain involved throughout the entire development
process and their credibility influences critical decisions (U.S. General Accounting
Office, 2000:41). Managers encourage and reward testers for discovering flaws as early
as possible (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000:44). Consequently, all the firms GAO
reviewed made commitments to executing disciplined validation methods and providing
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abundant time and funding to accomplish them (U.S. General Accounting Office,
2000:41).
DoD PMs viewed T&E and testers completely opposite to commercial firms. PMs
perceive T&E as less constructive and just an obstacle to overcome to acquire funding or
progress to the next milestone (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000:42). This creates
an adversarial relationship between program managers and the test community which
significantly limits the influence of testers on the program (U.S. General Accounting
Office, 2000:48). GAO found that test officials repeatedly voiced serious concerns, but
PMs fixated on cost and schedule deadlines overruled them (U.S. General Accounting
Office, 2000:49). Commercial firms required testing become a centerpiece of the
development process; however, schedule and funding dedicated to testing contribute only
a trivial portion of the development process for the DoD (U.S. General Accounting
Office, 2000:51).
Overall, the DoD T&E process was vastly inferior to commercial firms. Because
of the fierce competition for funding among programs, several issues arose (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 2000:41-49).
1. The necessity of estimates to fall within forecasted available funding led to
overly optimistic estimates.
2. The pressure to distinguish itself from other programs encouraged the
inclusion of differentiating capabilities utilizing less mature technology and
encouraged PMs to accept increases in technical unknowns and risk.
3. Problems revealed during T&E could jeopardize future funding which caused
PMs to delay challenging tests and limit communication of poor results.
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4. Testing methods were degraded and funding was cut for other priorities so the
program could maintain low advertised costs.
5. T&E became an afterthought instead of a focal point of development.
6. Few incentives existed for discovering an issue early.
The consequence of the previously mentioned issues resulted in postponing
validation until late in development, which often caused late-cycle churn (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 2000:42). PMs preferred results showing the minimum progress
needed to continue the program instead of testing against criteria, which could possibly
expose system limitations (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000:48).
Instead of using testing, especially in the early stages, as a vital learning
mechanism and an opportunity to expand product knowledge, testing is often used
as a basis for withholding funding, costly rescheduling, or threats of
cancellation…distrust remains between the development and test communities,
noting that some program offices have been reluctant to involve these
communities early in an attempt to maintain control of the early test results. (U.S.
General Accounting Office, 2000:49)

The DoD T&E process and incentives need an overhaul to correct these failures and
reach the superior T&E capabilities utilized by commercial firms.
In the summer of 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) established a Defense Science Board (DSB)
Task Force to investigate the causes of the large proportion of programs completing
IOT&E with a final evaluation of “not operationally effective and/or suitable.” Of the
programs completing IOT&E since 2000, almost 50% received an evaluation of “not
operationally effective and/or suitable” with issues of suitability dominating and
reliability failings representing the main deficiency (Defense Science Board Task Force,
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2008:13). The report focused on reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM)
issues and particularly on reliability issues because they account for 50% of the root
causes of suitability failures (Defense Science Board Task Force, 2008:23).
The report’s findings identified several issues in the T&E process as factors for
poor suitability evaluations. First, after the events of September 11, 2001, the Combatant
Commanders desired new capabilities delivered quickly to deploy against adapting
threats. This desire resulted in sacrificing rigorous T&E to meet the schedule demands of
the commanders (Defense Science Board Task Force, 2008:15). Next, budgetary
pressures influenced a reduction of the DT&E portion of the total research, development,
test and evaluation (RDT&E) budget. For example, the Air Force reduced the DT&E
portion of the RDT&E budget from 9.8% in 1996 to 7.3% in 2005 (Defense Science
Board Task Force, 2008:19). Finally, reliability growth processes where “a system is
continually tested from the beginning of development, reliability problems are uncovered,
and corrective actions are taken as soon as possible” were discontinued in the mid-1990s
(Defense Science Board Task Force, 2008:21).
The report also explains that Army studies indicate “almost 90% of the in-service
costs are directly correlated with the reliability of the system” (Defense Science Board
Task Force, 2008:22). Consequences resulting from poor reliability include reduced
performance in the field and LCC increases. The V-22 program required over $1B in
additional funding to solve its suitability problems. Because of the substantial
sustainment costs during the life cycle of a system, reliability investments can result in a
significant ROI (Defense Science Board Task Force, 2008:22).
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Finally, the DSB presented an example of the ROI of reliability. A Logistics
Management Institute (LMI) study on reliability, discussed more thoroughly in the next
section of the chapter, concluded “an investment in total program reliability equal to
twice the average production unit cost would yield an approximate 35% reduction in
support costs” (Defense Science Board Task Force, 2008:23). Minimal investments in
reliability will successfully impact both operational availability and the LCC of the
system. “This additional increase in reliability usually requires finding failure modes
through continuous testing” (Defense Science Board Task Force, 2008:22). One of the
primary recommendations from the task force included improving DT&E to discover and
correct suitability deficiencies early which improves the chance of success during IOT&E
(Defense Science Board Task Force, 2008:13).
DOT&E submits a report to Congress annually to comply with statutory
requirements. “In 2010, Congress expressed concern that significant problems with
acquisition programs are being discovered during operational testing that: (1) should have
been discovered in development testing and (2) should have been corrected prior to
operational testing” (Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 2014:13). Over the last
three FY reports (FY11-FY13), DOT&E started reporting significant issues discovered
during operational testing that “in my view should have been discovered and resolved
prior to the commencement of operational testing” (Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, 2011:11). The three reports identified 46 programs (17 in 2010-2011, 17 in
2012, and 12 in 2013) with significant issues. In addition, 33 programs between FY12
and FY13 experienced over 400 cybersecurity vulnerabilities in which 90% should have
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been corrected earlier during system development (Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, 2014:14).
After the implementation of WSARA, DOT&E started receiving assessments of
operational test readiness (AOTRs), in which the DASD(DT&E) makes
recommendations on a system’s readiness to enter IOT&E. Since 2009, DOT&E
received six AOTRs recommending against the system continuing to IOT&E. All six
programs proceeded with IOT&E despite the recommendation. Five of six (83%) of the
programs performed poorly and experienced significant issues during IOT&E. “The trend
is that major discrepancies are being discovered and raised to the Service leadership, but
decisions to enter IOT&E are not being affected by these AOTRs” (Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation, 2011:11).
The most recent GAO report on selected weapon programs was published in
March 2014. The GAO has been recommending multiple knowledge-based practices
since the inception of its first report assessing selected weapon programs in 2003. The
following examples, from the 2014 report on selected weapon programs, examine the
DoD’s current activities as compared to GAO’s longstanding recommendations in
regards to technology demonstration and testing. The examples illustrate the continued
practice of delaying testing until late in the acquisition process.
Two of the knowledge-based practices recommend to demonstrate all critical
technologies in a realistic environment and to test an early integrated prototype prior to
the critical design review (CDR). Three programs conducted a CDR in 2013 and none of
the three programs completed either the demonstration of critical technologies or the
testing of an early prototype. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle conducted system
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prototype testing seven months after its CDR, the KC-46 Tanker program plans to start
18 months after its CDR, and the Warfighter Integrated Network-Tactical Increment 3
plans to start 22 months after its CDR. The report also assessed 30 other programs that
held a CDR prior to 2013. Six of the 30 programs demonstrated all critical technologies
prior to the CDR. Only three of the 25 non-ship programs tested an early integrated
prototype with the other 21 non-ship programs starting an average of 33 months after the
CDR (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014a:32).
Another knowledge-based practice, as well as DoD policy, recommends to
demonstrate a production-representative prototype works as intended in its planned
environment. One of two programs that started production in 2013 previously tested a
production-representative prototype in its intended environment. Sixteen programs that
held production decisions prior to 2013 were assessed and six programs actually tested a
production-representative prototype prior to the start of production. Five of 14 programs
with future production decisions plan to have tested a production-representative prototype
prior to the production decision (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014a:35).
The report also evaluated the extent of concurrent DT and production among
programs currently in production and programs that will start production in the next few
years. Starting with programs currently in production, 15 out of 18 plan to or have
already completed more than 30% of DT concurrent with production. Five out of eight
programs currently executing concurrent test and production also plan to have greater
than 10% of the procurement quantities under contract prior to the completion of DT.
“The F-35 program in particular plans to have 530 aircraft, more than 20 percent of its
total procurement quantity, under contract at a cost of approximately $57.8 billion before
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developmental testing is completed in 2017” (U.S. Government Accountability Office,
2014a:46-47). Of the 12 programs GAO assessed that will have a production decision in
the next few years, half of them intend to conduct more than 30% of DT concurrent with
production. Two of the six plan to procure more than 10% of the total procurement
quantity prior to the completion of DT (U.S. Government Accountability Office,
2014a:46-47).
The JSF is a prime example of concurrent test and production and has been
controversial because of its history of cost growth. The JSF, as planned, will be the most
expensive acquisition program in DoD history. The JSF program, from October 2001 to
August 2013, already had total program cost growth of $107.5 billion in FY 2014 dollars
or a 47.8% increase in total program cost and unit cost growth of 72.5% due to a
reduction in the planned procurement quantity of 14.3% (U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 2014a:69).
The JSF program began development in 2001 and started production in 2007 with
all three variants not expected to start flight testing until two years later and fully
integrated flight testing not expected until four years later (U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 2007a:89). In 2007, the DoD decreased test aircraft and flight test
hours to preserve schedule and cost plans (U.S. Government Accountability Office,
2008:105). Despite flight testing only 2% complete in November 2008 and a fully
integrated, capable aircraft not expected to be available for at least four years, the
program decided to accelerate the production of an additional 169 aircraft between FYs
2010 and 2015 (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009:94). As of December
31

2009, only four of the planned 13 developmental aircraft had flown; flight testing was
merely 3% complete and a fully integrated, capable aircraft was not expected until 2012
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010a:84). The 2014 GAO reported observed
several issues the JSF continues to confront including: four critical technologies are still
not mature, design changes continue, developmental testing is far from complete and may
drive further design and manufacturing changes in the future, and only 25% of critical
manufacturing processes are mature and capable of consistent production quality (U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 2014a:69-70).
The previously summarized reports from the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), the Defense Science Board (DSB), and the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation (DOT&E) maintain consistent themes and language dating back to 1989. For
well over 25 years, these same themes have been documented by several different
agencies, yet they continue to occur. The following list highlights the critical takeaways
from these reports.
1. The central theme repeatedly emphasized in every study is the DoD should
maximize T&E effort and funding as early as possible to discover problems early
in the program when modifications cost significantly less, are easier to
implement, and cause less of a disruption to the program.
2. Multiple pressures placed upon the PM such as the urgency of the requirement,
the competition for available funding, and schedule demands outweigh the need to
identify and correct deficiencies as early as possible.
3. Pressures in 2.) result in multiple T&E issues including:
a. T&E becomes an afterthought and not a focal point of development.
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b. Trade-offs occur between testing and other priorities.
c. Programs cut corners weakening the T&E process.
d. PMs accept increased technical unknowns and risks from utilizing less
mature technology because of the necessity to differentiate its capabilities
from other programs to receive more funding.
e. Programs view the start of production as the most important aspect of the
program, regardless if the system works as intended, and attempt to reduce
the testing process to start production as soon as possible.
f. PMs prefer results showing the minimum progress required to move the
program forward and delay challenging tests out of fear of jeopardizing
future funding if testing reveals problems.
g. Test officials repeatedly voice serious concerns to leadership, but
leadership overrules them.
4. Concurrent development creates an inconducive environment for thorough T&E
and the GAO routinely recommends less concurrent development and production.
5. Programs identify and resolve issues during OT&E or late in the program that
should have been discovered and corrected during DT&E
6. The most significant capability missing from T&E is the ability to measure the
ROI of testing.
How do commercial firms apply T&E with greater success than the DoD? As
previously mentioned, leading commercial companies experienced late issues in the past;
however, by utilizing T&E early and effectively, the companies now experience far fewer
issues and create products faster, cheaper, and of higher quality. The firms purposefully
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schedule difficult tests early in development to discover problems early and avoid
significant issues creeping up late in product creation. Regardless of the testing tools
applied, the one successful strategy common to all the leading companies includes
validating products at increasing maturity levels by testing the technology, components,
and subsystems individually and together before testing a complete system in a realistic
environment. In contrast, the DoD, because of the variety of pressures previously
mentioned, too often cancels or postpones difficult tests until late in the development
when it tests the whole system together.
Methodologies Applied in Previous Research
This section examines methodologies applied in previous research and compares
them with this research. First, two recent reports discussing reliability and LCC are
explored because they utilize a similar methodology. Finally, several sources that
address different methods of determining the value of T&E are analyzed.
Logistics Management Institute (LMI) Government Consulting published a
report in 2007 entitled Empirical Relationships between Reliability Investments and LifeCycle Support Costs. “Test results since 2001 show that roughly 50 percent of DoD’s
programs are unsuitable at the time of initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E),
because they do not achieve reliability goals” (Long et al., 2007:iii). Reliability plays a
substantial role in determining LCC. DOT&E, concerned with the potential
consequences of poor reliability testing, solicited LMI to “study the cost of not achieving
adequate levels of operational suitability by investigating the empirical relationships
between reliability investment and life-cycle support costs” (Long et al., 2007:iii).
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LMI created two overarching constructs to approach the problem. The first
construct stated “reliability is a function of reliability goal setting, maturity of
technology, and investment in reliability effort,” and the second construct explained
“support cost is a function of utilization, primarily density and operational tempo
(OPTEMPO); product design, for example, reliability and maintainability; and support
process design, particularly repair cycle time” (Long et al., 2007:iii).
The report analyzed six case studies: Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV),
Global Hawk UAV, MH-60S Fleet Combat Support Helicopter, CH-47F Improved Cargo
Helicopter (ICH), Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below (FBCB2) system,
and a complex vehicle electronics system (Long et al., 2007:iv). For each case study,
Long et al. (2007:1-2) utilized the Cost Analysis Strategy Assessment (CASA) model to
estimate the life cycle support costs for reliability demonstrated early in the program and
to estimate the life cycle support costs using the most current reliability information. The
data from the case studies helped develop two relationships: “the relationship between
investment in reliability and reliability improvement” and “the relationship between
reliability improvement and support cost reduction” (Long et al., 2007:iv).
LMI results indicated reliability improvements ranging from 23.6% to 674.5% for
the five fielded systems and concluded the results are likely system and technology
independent (Long et al., 2007:3-1;2-32). Further, the authors reported the following
ROI ratios and reductions in 20-year support costs (2003 dollars) for four fielded
systems: Predator UAV ROI of 22.7:1 and support cost reduction of $887.2M or 60.6%,
Global Hawk UAV ROI of 5:1 and support cost reduction of $588.6M or 23.1%, MH60S ROI of 49:1 and support cost reduction of $319.9M or 83.2%, FBCB2 ROI of 128:1
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and support cost reduction of $11,179.6M or 85.6% (Long et al., 2007). The authors
stressed, “The relationship between investment in reliability and support cost reduction is
almost certainly system and technology dependent…should not be generalized (Long et
al., 2007:2-35).
LMI emphasized two critical findings: “reliability goals, although established and
articulated in operational requirements documents, do not appear to be driving either
management or engineering effort” and “under-investment in reliability may be large”
(Long et al., 2007:3-1). The authors criticized the quality and lack of data and
highlighted several data issues in the report. However, LMI concluded, “While
recognizing the limitations flowing from a limited sample and the less-than-ideal data,
the preliminary results indicate that it is possible to estimate the reduction in support cost
as a function of reliability investment” (Long et al., 2007:vi).
A year after the LMI report, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) published a
report in 2008 entitled Cost of Unsuitability: Assessment of Trade-offs Between the Cost
of Operational Unsuitability and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
Costs. “Between 1984 and 2006, 36 out of the 136 systems that underwent operational
test and evaluation (OT&E) were evaluated as unsuitable” (Lo et al., 2008:S-1). DOT&E
requested the IDA conduct a study on unsuitability with two specific questions: “When a
system is found to be operationally unsuitable, what are the associated costs?” and “To
what extent can such costs be avoided by addressing unsuitability issues during the
System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase?” (Lo et al., 2008:S-1).
Operational suitability consists of a system’s safety, interoperability, availability,
maintainability, and reliability; however, to ensure the scope of the report remained
36

manageable, Lo et al. (2008:S-1) limited the characterization of unsuitability to just the
aspect of substandard reliability. Substandard reliability, measured by low mean time
between maintenance (MTBM), low mean time between failures (MTBF), and other
factors, was chosen because the “associated costs are large, readily identifiable, and
calculable using validated methods” (Lo et al., 2008:S-1). The authors described the cost
of unsuitability as the additional LCC occurring from maintenance personnel,
replacement parts, repairs, and initial spares (Lo et al., 2008:S-4).
The report examined three aircraft (F-22, MV-22, and C-17), which addressed
substandard reliability with different approaches. Both the F-22 and MV-22 received
unsuitable evaluations during IOT&E and then attempted to resolve the unsuitable
reliability through additional investment in re-design, re-engineering, and retrofit of
fielded units (Lo et al., 2008:S-1). In contrast, the C-17 wanted to avoid failure at
IOT&E after early flight testing revealed several reliability metrics, including the primary
reliability metric (PRM), remained below contractually specified growth curves;
therefore, the C-17 program invested heavily and early in reliability improvements during
SDD (Lo et al., 2008:S-2). The authors applied four steps to analyze the three aircraft:
First, we projected the system’s primary reliability metric (PRM) at maturity both
with and without additional reliability investment. Second, we identified the
system’s additional reliability investment. Third, we estimated the reduction in the
system’s LCC that resulted from the investment-driven increase in reliability.
Finally, we compared the reliability investment to the LCC reduction it produced.
(Lo et al., 2008:S-2)
The IDA study utilized previously validated simulation models, cost estimating
relationships (CERs), and demand curves to calculate the reduction in LCC (Lo et al.,
2008:S-4).
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Gross LCC savings in 2007 dollars and ROI ratios for each system include: F-22
$0.8B and 2.8, MV-22 $5.0B and 5.7, C-17 $16.1B and 18.3 (Lo et al., 2008:S-7).
Because the programs exhibited vastly different LC flying hours, Lo et al. (2008:S-7)
standardized the data by dividing the ROI by the total LC flight hours, resulting in these
adjusted ROI figures: F-22 2.3, MV-22 2.0, and C-17 3.5. “Even the adjusted ROIs show
that the C-17’s strategy of investing to improve substandard reliability during SDD
produced substantially greater returns than those of the F-22 or MV-22” (Lo et al.,
2008:S-7).
The authors suggested two plausible reasons for the C-17’s superior ROI: system
configuration changes during SDD, when the changes are easier to accomplish, resulted
in “proportionally larger increases in reliability for a given amount of investment” and
because contractor development resources (capital and labor) were already available
during SDD, reliability improvement projects cost less (Lo et al., 2008:S-7). Overall, the
findings of Lo et al. (2008:41) indicate that investing in reliability during any acquisition
phase provides value and significantly reduces LCC. The IDA study concluded, “While
the results of the study are only illustrative of the optimality of suitability investment
during SDD, it may not be feasible to generate statistical confidence to that effect” (Lo et
al., 2008:42).
The latest DOT&E annual report published in January of 2014 illustrated the lack
of improvement in reliability. From FY97 to FY13, only 75 of 135, or 56%, of systems
that conducted initial operational testing met or exceeded reliability thresholds (depicted
in Figure 4), compared to 64% of systems between FY85 and FY96 (Director,
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Operational Test and Evaluation, 2014:vi). Reliability thresholds include such factors as
mean time between failure and mean time between maintenance.

Figure 4. Fraction of DOT&E Oversight Programs Meeting Reliability Thresholds at
IOT&E (Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 2014:vi)

The two reliability studies support this research because they apply similar
methodologies utilizing cost avoidance, and both reliability and T&E investments are
critical to the success of each other. To improve reliability, the reliability issues must be
discovered through testing, corrected, and then tested again to ensure the reliability
improved. Both reliability reports highlighted two critical issues also faced in testing:
DoD programs, despite the rhetoric and literature emphasizing the importance,
inadequately invest in reliability and reliability deficiencies corrected early incur
substantially less costs.
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Other literature sources focus mostly on measuring the value of T&E through risk
reduction. Bjorkman et al. (2013:541) estimate uncertainty reduction using Shannon’s
information entropy and apply the uncertainty reduction as a direct measure of test value;
this enables a decision maker to optimize the allocation of test resources among a test
portfolio based on the value the tests provide by using cost as the only constraint.
Browning (2003:53) explains that in its simplest form, the ratio of the benefits to cost
represents the value. Browning (2003:53) developed a risk value method by measuring
the benefits (value) as the reduction of risk.
Deonandan et al. (2010) continue to develop the Prescriptive and Adaptive
Testing Framework (PATFrame) with the focus of their research on unmanned and
autonomous system of systems (SoS). Through a combination of surveys, interviews,
and working group meetings with the DoD T&E community, Deonandan et al. (2010)
identified significant cost drivers applicable to T&E. “Number of systems, integration
complexity, number of requirements, technology maturity, synchronization complexity,
requirements changes test complexity and diversity are all rated very high in their
impacts on effort for SoS testing” (Deonandan et al., 2010). The authors describe testing
as risk mitigation, and by using a risk-based approach they identified the risks that need
to be mitigated and suggest making testing decision priorities based on the identified
risks (Deonandan et al., 2010).
These literature sources provide several key insights applicable to DoD testing.
The DoD test community should optimize the value of a portfolio of tests and not just
each individual test. However, the value of a test should not just directly measure
uncertainty reduction except in circumstances where safety represents the critical
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consideration of a test. The costs of the consequences of failure must be considered as
well to properly compare the benefits to the costs. If safety is not an issue and the costs
of the consequences remain small, then there is little incentive to conduct testing to
reduce uncertainty.
PMs also benefit by focusing T&E considerations on maximizing value instead of
focusing only on reducing costs. T&E activities do not just provide value in the
information acquired from one particular test; the maximization of value occurs through
the sequencing and coordination of the whole T&E process so that the right information
reaches the right organization at the right time resulting in the right decision. Deonandan
et al. (2010) remain in the preliminary stages of developing a cost and risk model for
T&E, but, if successful, the model may develop into a much needed addition to both the
T&E and cost estimating communities. The fact that the authors focus on both risk and
cost is imperative. By reducing the uncertainty of the most significant costs drivers,
savings throughout the LCC of the system occur.
Summary
This chapter provided an overview of T&E, examined the incentives that drive the
acquisition process, presented a significant sample of historical reports documenting the
inadequacy of T&E throughout the last four decades, and explored prior methodologies
utilized to determine the value of T&E. The historical documentation provides a
convincing argument for both the recurring inadequacy of T&E and the vital need of this
research. Prior methodologies focused primarily on the reduction in uncertainty as a
measure of the value of testing. However, the cost of the consequences of failure must be
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taken into account as well to accurately compare the benefits to costs and calculate a
return on investment. The next chapter studies two cases from the JPATS program. Both
indicate insufficient T&E results in costly modifications when the issues are finally
discovered in the future. One case demonstrates the inadequacy of T&E and the other
case illustrates the elimination of testing by the PM.
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III. Methodology and Results
Chapter II discusses two reports measuring the ROI of early investments in
reliability. Both reports calculated the ROI of reliability based on the cost avoidance in
the LCC if the programs invested in and improved reliability earlier in the program. This
research applies a similar methodology by calculating the ROI of the cost avoidance if
the program discovered and corrected an issue early, during developmental testing and
before the start of production, as opposed to the program discovering and correcting the
issue late in the program. Two cases from the JPATS program are utilized to
demonstrate the methodology. The next section explains the methodology framework.
Finally, the remainder of Chapter III investigates the background of the JPATS program
and the two cases, delves further into the application of the methodology to each case,
and reports the results.
Methodology Framework
The methodology utilizes a case study approach. Both cases involve an issue
discovered late in the program that should have, according to program office SMEs, been
discovered and corrected during DT&E. The methodology framework consists of four
steps applied to each case:
1. Calculate the actual costs incurred by the systems program office (SPO) to correct
the issue.
2. Estimate the costs incurred by the SPO if the issue had been identified and
corrected during DT&E and before the start of production.

43

3. Calculate the cost avoidance by subtracting the estimated costs from the actual
costs.
4. Calculate the ROI by dividing the cost avoidance by the estimated initial
investment needed to identify and correct the issue during DT&E.
The JPATS program provided the firm-fixed price contracts required to correct each
issue. All costs are converted from constant year dollars to base year 2014 dollars using
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) inflation calculator in Microsoft Excel®.
SMEs from both within the JPATS program and outside the program are consulted to
assist in the cost estimate had the issue been identified and corrected in DT&E. In order
to capture the uncertainty in the SME’s estimate, they provide three estimates: low, most
likely, and high. The differences of the actual costs and estimated costs are calculated for
each of the three estimates and divided by each of the respective estimated costs to
compute a low, most likely, and high ROI for each issue.
JPATS Program Background
In 1989, the Congressional Armed Services Committees directed the DoD to
submit a procurement plan for Air Force and Navy training aircraft for the 21st century.
The DoD consolidated Air Force and Navy requirements and strategies into a single
trainer aircraft plan. The strategy included the joint acquisition of a primary aircraft
training system (Stockman et al., 2011:129). JPATS consists of three elements: T-6
Texan II, ground based training system, and contractor logistics support (Kinzig and
Bailey, 2010:50). It replaced the AF T-37B and the Navy’s T-34C (Stockman et al.,
2011:129).
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Just before the JPATS program began, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act
(FASA) of 1994 was passed. The Pentagon’s acquisition reform office wanted low risk
programs with a high probability to succeed to become Defense Acquisition Pilot
Programs (DAPP) to demonstrate FASA’s innovative commercial practices and persuade
the DoD to implement FASA initiatives. JPATS served as one of the initial DAPPs
(Stockman et al., 2011:129-130).
Because of the JPATS DAPP designation, JPATS was specified a commercial
based program and sought an aircraft with an existing Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) certification. In 1995, Raytheon Beech Aircraft won the contract award with its
proposed Pilatus PC-9 commercial aircraft. However, by the time development was
completed and the aircraft missionized, the final product comprised few commonalities
with the original design. Further, the FAA certification required testing the AF and Navy
did not require, only allowed FAA certified pilots to fly the testing requirements instead
of AF test pilots, and resulted in additional cost and schedule slip which provided little
benefit to the AF and limited the time the AF could test (Stockman et al., 2011:131-132).
“FAA testing was given number one priority with Government tests occurring as time
permitted” (Kinzig and Bailey, 2010:43).
A 2000 DOT&E report noted that although a Milestone III production decision
was already scheduled, contractor developmental testing was still not complete and future
testing still included both fatigue and durability testing. The same report also stated that
aircraft delivery to the user occurred prior to the completion of developmental and
operational testing and concluded “delivery of any system to the user prior to completion
of appropriate testing is never a good situation. The process by how a system is chosen
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to be a commercial acquisition candidate should be reviewed” (Director, Operational Test
and Evaluation, 2001:V-108).
The Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center conducted two OT&Es,
one in 2001 and the other in 2003, both with the same result; they concluded the T-6
Texan II was operationally effective with numerous limitations and deficiencies but not
suitable because of maintenance and support issues (Stockman et al., 2011:133). The
DOT&E sent a letter to the Secretary of the Air Force in August of 2001 highlighting his
concerns about initiating student pilot training and entering full rate production before the
safety and suitability issues identified during OT&E are corrected. The decision to
continue with the program was implemented, despite the DOT&E concerns, and student
pilot training began at Moody AFB in October of 2001 and initial operational capability
officially started in July 2002 (Kinzig and Bailey, 2010:50). The two following cases
illustrate issues that resulted from limited testing and ignoring DOT&E
recommendations.
Case I: Control Stick Lever Replacement
The first case involves the T-6 control stick. The control stick for the T-6 was
originally an aluminum cast component. During development, a fatigue test was
performed in March 2001 on the entire flight control system for two lifetimes. At that
time, no cracking issues were identified with the control stick.
The T-6 aircraft began experiencing several failures with the control stick casting
beginning in 2011. All Navy and AF aircraft were grounded until the control stick
successfully passed inspections (Department of Defense, 2011:5). After the control stick
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failures, a recommendation was made to examine the original control stick previously
fatigue tested. Utilizing non-destructive inspection (NDI) techniques not previously
used, a crack on the control stick was identified.
After identifying the cracking issues, the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL)
Materials Integrity Branch conducted several studies to determine the problem. The
AFRL concluded the fractures were preceded by fatigue cracking. AFRL tested the
fatigue crack growth rates revealing a faster growth rate than the NASGRO® database
(software for fatigue crack growth analysis), which the manufacturer used for its analysis
(Ware, 2012).
The control stick links the pilot’s control inputs with the flight control surfaces.
Fractures of the control stick can seriously compromise the pilot’s ability to operate the
aircraft’s ailerons and elevator, possibly resulting in a loss of aircraft (Ware, 2012). The
JPATS program office decided to replace all of the control stick levers after
recommendation from the AFRL. The redesigned control stick is a wrought aluminum
lever which at higher loads did not crack after 10,000,000 cycles whereas the cast
aluminum lever previously on the aircraft showed cracking in as few as 5,000 cycles.
The new control lever component dramatically extends the service life (Jacobs et al.,
2013).
The JPATS program office provided the two firm-fixed price contracts to resolve
the issue. The two contracts were for engineering change proposal (ECP) 156 which
modified contract number FA8617-07-D-6151 0015. The first contract resulted in a cost
of $2,407,648 in FY 2013. The second contract resulted in a cost of $1,677,329 in FY
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2014. Utilizing the OSD inflation calculator, the total cost is $4,121,092 in FY 2014.
Both control stick levers on 789 Air Force and Navy T-6 Texan II aircraft were replaced.
It would not be cost effective to perform an NDI on every component. However,
all safety of flight or fracture critical components should receive an NDI. If the control
stick would have originally received the safety of flight classification, as AFRL later
argued and the control stick did eventually receive, then an NDI would have been
performed and the crack discovered. Therefore, the only test not originally executed that
would have needed to be done to discover the cracking is the NDI. The cost, according
to the AFRL, to prepare and complete an NDI is $445 in FY 2014.
The difference between the actual cost and the additional investment in testing
represents the cost avoidance which equals $4,120,647. The cost savings divided by the
additional investment in testing calculates the ROI which equals a ROI percentage of
9,260%. The difference in cost between originally using cast versus wrought aluminum
is negligible and not included in the estimate.
This case represents an example of insufficient testing. By not originally
performing an NDI, the JPATS office now faces this costly situation today. One issue
with the control stick involved the control stick not receiving safety of flight
classification. According to Hawker Beechcraft Defense Company (HBDC), the control
stick was not fracture critical and received a Grade B casting per MIL-A-21180 (Ware,
2012). However, AFRL argued, “the lever assembly is critical to flight safety and is also
a highly stressed component with margins of less than 10 percent in select locations.
According to MIL-A-21180 and JSSG-2006, this component should be classified as
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fracture critical, Grade A (highly stressed)” (Ware, 2012). After the control stick issues,
the control stick attained reclassification as a safety of flight component.
Case II: Nose Landing Gear Friction Collar Retrofit
The second case involves the T-6 landing gear. According to the program office,
the PM decided to cut landing gear testing to save money. In April 2007, the program
office identified the nose landing gear (NLG) shimmy as an area of interest. A NLG
shimmy consists of a rapid and violent left and right oscillation of the nose wheel and can
occur during landing or takeoff, but primarily during landing. The NLG shimmy can
cause damage or deterioration to aircraft components. Control of the aircraft may be
compromised which can result in runway departure, loss of aircraft, and injury to pilots.
Both the Navy and AF continued reporting shimmy events with 1,326 reported
through June 2009. In October 2007, a severe NLG shimmy occurred resulting in
assembly component damage. The FAA deemed the NLG unsafe and in December 2007
directed HBDC to investigate the root cause and develop a solution. Furthermore, HBDC
concluded the NLG shimmy events initiate cracks in the NLG upper strut housing. The
cracks required increased maintenance inspections and the shortage of spare struts
resulted in grounded aircraft which reduced aircraft availability for the mission. This
example demonstrates how one issue can easily lead to multiple issues with negative
effects.
HBDC designed a NLG friction collar as the solution to preventing the shimmy
events and received FAA certification for it in September 2011. The JPATS program
office provided the firm-fixed price contract to resolve the issue. The contract was for
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ECP 151 which modified contract number FA8617-07-D-6151 0015. The contract
resulted in a cost of $1,129,896 in FY 2013. Utilizing the OSD inflation calculator,
retrofitting the T-6 Texan II aircraft with the NLG friction collar resulted in a cost of
$1,146,844 in FY 2014. The SME providing the estimate works at the Air Force Material
Command Landing Gear Test Facility, which performs full-gear failure and fatigue and
wear testing on landing gear. The SME estimates for performing complete landing gear
testing, including fatigue testing include: low estimate of $500K, most likely estimate of
$750K, and a high estimate of $1.5M. The increased range from the most likely to high
estimate is due to the uncertainty in follow-on testing required if initial testing identifies
issues.
The difference between the actual cost and the additional investment in testing
represents the cost avoidance which equals $646,844 for the low, $396,844 for the most
likely, and a loss of $353,156 for the high. The cost savings divided by the additional
investment in testing calculates the ROI which equals a ROI percentage of 129% for the
low, 53% for the most likely, and a negative return of 24% for the high.
Summary
Chapter III details the methodology applied to each case study issue. A brief
background and discussion of the issue supplements each case study. The methodology
framework contains four steps applied to each case to calculate the ROI for each
particular issue. Each case study includes the ROI results of that case. The next and final
chapter discusses the implications for PMs and the acquisition community. This chapter
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makes recommendations for action and future research along with significance of the
research.
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IV. Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions of Research
Both JPATS cases illustrate the potential savings and ROI resulting from
discovering and correcting issues early. Only with the substantially high landing gear
estimate did the ROI actually result in a potentially negative ROI of 24%. The positive
results ranged from 53% to 129% ROI for the landing gear and 9,260% ROI for the
control stick.
Because of the limited data of only two cases, no statistically significant
conclusions can be obtained from the results. Based on the literature’s discussion on the
value of identifying problems as early as possible and the potential ROIs from these two
cases, further research is essential. Finally, these cases only quantify the costs of the
material, labor, and overhead of the contractor and do not account for qualitative factors
that potentially result in greater costs than just the contract costs and would further
increase the ROI if eliminated.
Other factors more qualitative in nature also need to be considered when
discussing the consequences of not discovering issues until late in development or after
the deployment of the weapon system. This research focused on cost and the ROI, but
PMs must also consider qualitative factors when making T&E investment decisions. The
first and most important is the life of a military member. The failure of a system could
result in the loss of a service member’s life and safety considerations should never be
overlooked. Another imperative factor is mission readiness. The discovery of a critical
issue could substantially reduce or eliminate mission readiness by preventing the use of
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the system until a suitable solution is achieved. The entire T-6 fleet was grounded due to
the landing gear issues. Further, if the FAA deems an aircraft unsafe, production can be
halted until the contractor finds a suitable solution which can alter both future cost and
mission capability.
Finally, the opportunity cost characterizes the most important and often
overlooked cost because of the difficulty attempting to quantify it. Countless time and
effort are expended to find solutions to these issues. The two T-6 examples discussed are
still implementing solutions today and have already been ongoing for over 3 and 7 years.
The numerous hours exhausted investigating and implementing solutions to issues that
should never have occurred in the first place could have been applied to more productive
activities elsewhere.
Recommendations for Further Research
Further research on the ROI of T&E must undoubtedly be pursued. Future
research should match the original intent of this thesis by utilizing case 1 data (issues
identified during OT&E that should have been discovered and corrected during DT&E)
from the DOT&E programs identified in its annual reports. Utilizing these issues proves
the problems could be discovered during the T&E process with SMEs concluding the
problems should have been previously identified and corrected. Case 1 issues correspond
directly with the 2010 Congress inquiry.
Programs continually disregard DOT&E recommendations and proceed with
additional risk. ROI denotes an easily understood metric DOT&E can employ to
demonstrate to PMs the value of early discovery and the costly consequences of
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advancing the program without first ensuring the entire weapon system operates as
intended. To accomplish the research, DOT&E should start requiring each of the
identified program offices in its annual report to collect the data and make it available for
research. An independent organization, such as one previously mentioned in this
research (GAO, DSB, IDA, LMI), should conduct the study to avoid program office
biases, ensure independence, and because of the considerable effort it will require to
complete.
Discussion and Recommendations for Acquisition Reform
This research focused on examining the ROI of T&E; however, when combining
this research with previous research and philosophies discussed in Chapter II,
recommendations emerged for the much broader topic of acquisition reform. The
perception and criticism of the DoD acquisition process is that it follows a “build it now,
Band Aid™ it later” approach to acquisition (Hutchison, 2014:16). Frank Kendall,
current USD(AT&L), criticized the acquisition process when he proclaimed, “Putting the
F-35 into production years before the first test flight was acquisition malpractice”
(Majumdar, 2012). Steven Hutchison, former acting DASD(DT&E) claimed,
“Permitting development problems to become the warfighter’s problems is the real
definition of acquisition malpractice” (Hutchison, 2015:8). How can the DoD reform the
acquisition process to defend itself from criticism and prevent acquisition malpractice?
Acquisition reform efforts have appeared with regularity over the last four
decades. The GAO’s high risk list has included the DoD’s acquisition of major weapon
systems since 1990 and the GAO continues to observe the same issues that lead to the
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DoD’s first appearance on the list (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013:1).
“Reforms that focus on the methodological procedures of the acquisition process are only
partial remedies because they do not address incentives that deviate from sound
practices” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013:1). It is not necessarily
unsuccessful policy causing ineffective acquisition outcomes, but the incentives that
motivate deviations from policy (concurrent testing and production, optimistic
assumptions, and delayed testing) as multiple examples in Chapter II illustrated. “The
fact that programs adopt practices that run counter to what policy and reform call for is
evidence of the other pressures and incentives that significantly influence program
practices and outcomes” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013:7).
When PMs and acquisition executives fight to fund capabilities that enhance
national security and improve military safety, they almost certainly do so with sincere
intentions. “While individual participants see their needs as rational and aligned with the
national interest, collectively, these needs create incentives for pushing programs and
encouraging undue optimism, parochialism, and other compromises of good judgment”
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013:8). National security and military safety
comprise the primary mission of the DoD. How can anyone argue against rushing the
delivery of cutting-edge technologies and defense systems to the field? Rushing cuttingedge capabilities to the military enhances national security and saves lives. “Pressure to
make exceptions for programs that do not measure up are rationalized in a number of
ways: an urgent threat needs to be met; a production capability needs to be preserved;
despite shortfalls, the new system is more capable than the one it is replacing; or the new
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system’s problems will be fixed in the future” (U.S. Government Accountability Office,
2013:9). The sooner, the better, right? In the short term, this probably holds true.
However, an assessment of the long term may reveal that national security and military
safety become compromised in the future if the military is driven to reduce the size of the
force, accept fewer capabilities into the field, average system age escalates, reliability
diminishes, and some systems do not work as intended because of the deficiency in long
term affordability caused by an ineffective investment strategy and an inefficient
acquisition system.
In fact, even in the short term, lives may be lost when the capabilities do not work
as intended or suffer reliability issues in the field. The investigation into the MV-22B
Osprey crash on 8 April 2000 that killed 19 marines, disclosed testing requirements that
were severely curtailed (Defense Science Board Task Force, 2000:28). The program
limited developmental testing requirements to save money and stay on schedule. Is
national security enhanced and more lives saved from rushing capabilities into the field
or ensuring the long term affordability of the national security strategy? According to the
DoD website, the most important resource is “not tanks, planes or ships, it’s... People.
We will never compromise on the quality of our most important resource: the people”
(Department of Defense, n.d.). However, the future unaffordability of the entire
acquisition system results in fewer tanks, planes, ships, and people.
Two major decisions ultimately drive a program: the decision to initiate a
program and the decision to start production. Advancing a program prematurely,
especially at these decision points, leads to increased risk, cost growth, and schedule
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growth. The resulting recommendations concentrate on improving the acquisition
process through an investigation of the incentives that ultimately drive unsuccessful
results and countering those incentives by simplifying PM responsibilities and applying
rigorous T&E throughout the acquisition process. By first investigating the incentives,
motivations, and rationales that result in premature decisions, then recommendations can
be formulated to counter the premature decisions.
The first major decision involves the decision to initiate a program. Thomas
Christie, former DoD Director, OT&E from 2001 – 2005, delivered the keynote address
at the 2009 International Test and Evaluation (ITEA) Symposium in which he presented
an insightful view of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) processes he participated in.
Thomas Christie acknowledged,
Time and again I sat in program review meetings, including numerous DABs,
where I was struck by the lack of credible information concerning the status or the
results of development testing to date. In case after case, Pentagon decisionmakers acquiesced in programs entering EMD and even low-rate initial
production before technical problems were identified, much less solved; before
credible independent cost assessments were accomplished and included in
program budget projections; before critical technologies were shown to be
sufficiently mature; and even before the more risky requirements were
demonstrated in testing. (Christie, 2009)
Too often, PMs must start a program with a fatally flawed business case (U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 2014b:7). How can the DoD ensure technology
maturity so that a program is established with an executable foundation? The
determination of technology maturity is vague and overoptimistic assumptions about the
risk and maturity of the technology are encouraged through incentives for funding.
Despite noble intentions to reform policy and processes, the status quo process
continuously confronts inefficient acquisition outcomes caused by accepting too many
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programs that are unaffordable, competition for funding, immature technology, and
unstable support from DoD senior leaders and Congress.

Recommendation 1: An independent DoD test agency should test, validate, and then
officially certify a particular technology is mature and works as intended before the
technology can be accepted into an acquisition program.

Recommendation 2: Separate the competition for funding between science and
technology projects and acquisition programs by dedicating a portion of the acquisition
budget to the research and development of technology.

Recommendation 3: The DoD should accept fewer acquisition programs into the
acquisition process by making strategic investments in capability needs, and not
capability wants, that support the long term defense strategy. Specifically, trade-offs
must be formulated between long-term wants and short-term needs. Recommendation 1
should assist in limiting the number of acquisition programs through constraints on
technology maturity.

Recommendation 4: Once a program is initiated, DoD senior leaders and Congress
should fully support a program as long as the program remains relevant to the long term
defense strategy and the original business case that resulted in the investment in the
program has not changed.
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Recommendation 5: Congress should enforce PM and acquisition executive tenure laws
already established, particularly during the crucial stage of development.

Multiple benefits stem from recommendations 1 – 5. Acquiring a weapon system
through the acquisition process is a complex and daunting task for anyone. By first
ensuring the technology is mature through certification by the testing community, PMs
can focus on executing the program without also needing to develop technology.
Although testing will identify issues that will need be corrected, the risk of issues directly
related to technology readiness will be substantially reduced thus relieving PMs from also
resolving technology issues. Dedicating a portion of the acquisition budget to science
and technology provides an equitable balance between technology maturation and
program maturation.
Accepting fewer programs into the acquisition system and fully committing to
programs already accepted, PMs can spend less time fighting for funding or advocating
the relevance of the program which permits the PM to execute the program’s objectives.
“Program managers themselves believe that rather than making strategic investment
decisions, DoD starts more programs than it can afford and rarely prioritizes them for
funding purposes” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005:5). This initiates the
competition for funds at the inception of the acquisition process because it positions the
DoD acquisition system in a continuous state of unaffordability with too many systems
within the process and not enough money to afford all of them at the original intended
quantity. Obtaining full support diminishes the adversarial relationship that causes PMs
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to censor potentially damaging news and provides the foundation for desirable open
communication.
Jim Cramer, former hedge fund manager and host of CNBC’s “Mad Money”,
describes the financial asset investment process by advocating to research first and make
sure the investment has a strong business case before initiating the investment. Once
initiated, the process does not stop there; an investor must continue researching (possibly
on a quarterly or annual basis) to ensure the original business case that led to the decision
has not changed. The investor must avoid allowing fluctuations of the market to
influence the sell decision because the only reason to sell the investment is if the original
business case changes.
The same should hold true for DoD investments. “With an investment strategy,
senior leaders will be better positioned to formally commit to a business case that assures
new programs fit in with priorities, that they begin with adequate knowledge about
technology, time, and cost, and that they will follow a knowledge-based approach as they
move into design and production” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005:63).
Even though various setbacks will definitely occur, the DoD and Congress should fully
support the program unless the national defense strategy or the original business case
changes.
Several of the recommendations correspond with commercial practices.
Technology development is deliberately detached from a commercial PM’s
responsibilities because technology does not progress into a program unless mature and
proven to work as intended. The commercial PM receives full support from leadership
thus eliminating the advocacy role and encouraging open communication with leadership
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to discuss and implement solutions to issues. “Program managers we spoke with for this
review specifically cited this process as an enabler for their own success … it did not
require them to perform “heroic” efforts to overcome problems resulting from large gaps
between wants and resources, such as technology challenges or funding shortages” (U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 2005:23-26). DoD PMs deserve the same support as
their commercial counterparts. Figure 5 summarizes the keys differences of commercial
and DoD programs.

Figure 5. Key Differences in Definition of Success and Resulting Behaviors (U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 2005:55)

Finally, ensuring PMs and acquisition executives remain in their positions for
the timeframe established by law is critical to improving accountability and incentivizing
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a long-term prospective. This enables PMs and acquisition executives to implement
change and achieve their planned objectives that are now detailed in a program manager
agreement signed by the PM. Currently, career progression/broadening appear to
influence tenure length more than public law and DoD policy. How is a PM expected to
maintain a long-term perspective and accomplish program objectives when the average
tenure in less than 18 months?
The following recommendations now concentrate on the decision to start
production. The single most detrimental practice in the acquisition process, the way it
currently operates, is Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP). DoD policy states, without
specific details, OT&E should be conducted throughout the acquisition process; however,
LRIP has no definitive OT&E requirements for validating the system works as intended
before LRIP begins, which results in multiple harmful consequences (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 1994b:21). As a result, many programs fail to start OT&E until after
LRIP has already begun.
In the 1980s Congress discovered the DoD procuring significant quantities of
weapon systems through LRIP without successfully completing OT&E. In response,
Congress attempted to prevent the situation by enacting public law 101 – 189. According
to the law “LRIP was defined as the minimum quantity needed to (a) provide productionrepresentative articles for OT&E, (b) establish an initial production base, and (c) permit
orderly ramp-up to full-rate production upon completion of OT&E” (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 1994b:13). The law, although well-intentioned, has been ineffective
in preventing the LRIP process from producing significant quantities of weapon systems
under the facade of LRIP. “In the conference report for the act [public law 101 – 189],
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the conferees indicated that they did not condone the continuous reapproval of LRIP
quantities that eventually total a significant percentage of the total planned procurement”
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 1994b:13).
For example, the Global Hawk program started both development and limited
production at the same time in 2001, and by the end of 2013 the program procured all 45
aircraft through LRIP and never held a full rate production review (U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 2014a:116). In May 2011, DOT&E reported the Block 30 variant
was not operationally effective or suitable (U.S. Government Accountability Office,
2012:77). The program has experienced three Nunn-McCurdy breaches and the DoD and
Air Force proposed retiring the block 30 system to reduce program costs which would
affect half of the Global Hawk fleet of aircraft (U.S. Government Accountability Office,
2014a:116).
Two production decisions exist with the full-rate production (FRP) decision
representing the major decision as far as quantity. Consequently, legislation focused on
the entry criteria to start FRP and completely disregarded any entry criteria for starting
LRIP. Because LRIP does not require any OT and the FRP decision requires completion
of IOT&E, the testing paradigm was altered. Testing activities are delayed until late in
the acquisition process and the focus on IOT&E does not occur until after LRIP has
already begun. Political engineering almost guarantees that after a program starts LRIP
few circumstances can interrupt production. Therefore, in GAO’s view, the LRIP
decision often becomes the de-facto FRP decision. “LRIP is often continued, despite the
evidence of technical problems, well beyond that needed to provide test articles and to
establish an initial production capability. As a result, major production commitments are
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often made during LRIP” (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1994b:20). Technical
problems may delay the FRP decision, but LRIP is rarely halted or significantly slowed
down (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1994b:20).
According to 10 USC 2399, a program shall not proceed beyond low-rate initial
production (BLRIP) until IOT&E has been completed and a BLRIP report submitted to
the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, and the congressional defense committees (Cornell University Law
School, n.d.). However, no requirement exists necessitating successful completion of
OT&E. The BLRIP report is just one of multiple criteria considered prior to making the
FRP decision and an unfavorable designation of not operationally effective and/or
suitable fails to prevent the start of FRP. In fact, the BLRIP appears to have little, if any,
influence on the FRP decision. Thomas Christie, former Director, OT&E from 2001 –
2005, affirmed:
Speaking from my own experience as the DOT&E from 2001 to early 2005, my
office was responsible for producing roughly 30 Beyond Low-Rate Initial
Production, or BLRIP, reports to the Secretary of Defense and Congress. By law,
these reports are a prerequisite for any full-rate production decision. These reports
assessed over half of these systems to be either not operationally effective or not
operationally suitable, or both. In not one case was one of these programs stopped
as a result of the information available in the reports or presented at the
production DAB…some systems with serious reliability and maintenance
problems found in development and operational testing have been waived through
the decision process into production and deployment…What is disturbing about
these failures is that most of these programs should not have been cleared to enter
OT&E in the first place. They clearly had not completed development testing
successfully – they had either failed to meet effectiveness or suitability
requirements in DT&E or, in some cases, had truncated planned DT&E in order
to stay on schedule or to stay within costs. (Christie, 2009)
In a perfect acquisition process, DASD(DT&E) and DOT&E perform integrated T&E
throughout development, correcting issues as discovered, and IOT&E should be nothing
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more than a final confirmation that production is ready to begin. How can the DoD
decrease the risk of entering production prematurely?
Recommendation 6: Integrate DASD(DT&E) and DOT&E into a single agency that
conducts all independent oversight testing (Hutchison, 2015:10).
Recommendation 7: An independent DoD test agency must test, validate, and then
officially certify the system exceeds all key performance parameters, IOT&E has been
completed with the system verified as operationally effective and suitable, and there is
minimal risk of any further design changes before the start of production.
Recommendation 8: Congress should penalize noncompliant acquisition programs by
reducing or eliminating funding.
Integrating DASD(DT&E) and DOT&E can do more than just enhance
efficiency. The critical purpose of integrating is to prevent the thought process that one is
more critical than the other or that they are two separate activities. Both are
interdependent and need to be applied thoroughly during the entire LC of the system.
Combined into an integrated product team, both can work together to develop and
execute the TEMP so that the sequencing of test activities collects the data needed for
informed decision making.
As previously mentioned, LRIP currently permits too many unintentional
consequences. Before committing to FRP, IOT&E should be completed with the system
verified as operationally effective and suitable, and there should be minimal risk of any
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further design changes. LRIP can then be used for its intended purpose of slowly
ramping up production while ensuring the manufacturing process is in statistical control.
Once the manufacturing process has been tested and in statistical control, then FRP can
start. LRIP should not be ongoing while also continually updating design changes. The
sole purpose is to decrease the risk the weapon system enters production prematurely and
to prevent deficiencies that lead to major and costly modifications.
Finally, by Congress penalizing noncompliant programs, it sends a clear message
that noncompliance is no longer acceptable. “It is the funding approvals that ultimately
define acquisition policy” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013). As long as
Congress continues to fund noncompliant programs, more and more programs will
continue to defy the law and DoD policy because approving funding for noncompliant
programs implies noncompliance is acceptable.
James Madison realized the fault of human nature and knew checks and balances
were needed to counter ulterior motives. “This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival
interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system…where
the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each
may be a check on the other” (Madison, 1788). The recommendations proposed utilize
independent testing as the check against the milestone decision authority (MDA). The
test community and MDA incentives and responsibilities counteract each other. The
former is responsible for ensuring the weapon system works as intended to prevent the
military from receiving a deficient system while also attempting to minimize the cost of
future retrofits and repairs. The latter desires to acquire the weapon system to provide to
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the military as quickly as possible at minimum cost. Because of these differences in
incentives, an independent test agency is the ideal authority to certify the program is
ready to proceed at program initiation and the start of production. “While independent,
we [test community] also are a partner because we share the goal of ensuring that
development problems do not become the warfighter’s problems” (Hutchison, 2015:11).
Significance of Research
The United States and DoD continue to confront challenging financial times as
the U.S. debt expands and DoD funding shrinks. This research advocates for early and
rigorous T&E and proposes multiple recommendations to enhance the acquisition process
in an attempt to preserve the long term affordability and long term national defense
strategy. David Packard, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the
Packard commission, once recognized, “We all know what needs to be done. The
question is why aren’t we doing it?” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013:7).
By counteracting the incentives that cause deviations from law and policy, the DoD can
impact the root causes that influence deviations from policy and achieve a sustainable
transformation of the acquisition system.
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